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The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence · Study

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ArticleThe role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence

Kai Hielscher2012

OA

Articlegreen2012

The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence

Kai Hielscher · Gunther Markwardt

70 citations·0/0 files stored·European Journal of Political Economy

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Corruption and Economic Development Fiscal Policies and Political Economy

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References

1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans 2005Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses 1985The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target 1983A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model 2009Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate And Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2008 1993Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence 1992Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes 2006Political risk, institutions and foreign direct investment

Cited by

2014The Rule of Law in Monetary Affairs 2017Central bank independence and inflation in Africa: The role of financial systems and institutional quality 2015Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers 2013The central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?2017The rule of law, central bank independence and price stability

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2015Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empiricsarticle · 17 shared references 2009INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A META‐REGRESSION ANALYSISarticle · 15 shared references 2018The Political Economy of Reforms in Central Bank Design: Evidence from a New Datasetpreprint · 14 shared references 2011Replacing a “Disobedient” Central Bank Governor with a “Docile” One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Inflationarticle · 14 shared references 2008Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectivenesspreprint · 13 shared references 2013Social trust and central-bank independencearticle · 13 shared references

Details

Year2012

Typearticle

Published2012-01-14

VenueEuropean Journal of Political Economy

ISSN-L0176-2680

Languageen

Citations70

Files0 public / 0

ShelfMonetary Policy and Economic Impact

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doi10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.08.004

openalex_workW3122945877

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2020

The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence

2019Central bank independence and inflation—Old story told anew

2021Central bank independence, fiscal deficits and currency union: Lessons from Africa