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The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence

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References

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2001Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence

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512 cited

2008Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions — Past, present and future407 cited

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2014The Rule of Law in Monetary Affairs92 cited
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2017The rule of law, central bank independence and price stability35 cited
2020The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence31 cited
2019Central bank independence and inflation—Old story told anew28 cited
2014The Impact of Political Instability on Inflation Volatility in Africa27 cited
2021Central bank independence, fiscal deficits and currency union: Lessons from Africa27 cited
2020Impact of central bank independence and transparency on international equity portfolio allocation: A cross-country analysis27 cited
2017The Politics of Central Bank Appointments26 cited
2022Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Poverty in Africa22 cited
2020Earthquakes and Economic Outcomes: Does Central Bank Independence Matter?21 cited
2020The Independence of Central Banks, Political Institutional Quality and Financial Sector Development in Africa20 cited
2021Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)19 cited
2014The credibility of monetary policy announcements: Empirical evidence for OECD countries since the 1960s19 cited