this work references cited by second hopReferences
- 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives5,080 cited
- 1981Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts4,568 cited
- 1979Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts3,033 cited
- 2008What Matters in Corporate Governance?2,903 cited
- 2003Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem2,347 cited
- 2001Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are1,740 cited
- 1999The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels1,457 cited
- 2002Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation1,405 cited
- 1999CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis1,297 cited
- 2005CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism?874 cited
- 1996Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence753 cited
- 2004Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring615 cited
- 2006Pay without Performance575 cited
- 2005On the Benefits of Concurrent Lending and Underwriting539 cited
- 2009Rank‐Order Tournaments and Incentive Alignment: The Effect on Firm Performance
Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work