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Why do CEOs reciprocally sit on each other's boards? · Study

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ArticleWhy do CEOs reciprocally sit on each other's boards?

Eliezer M. Fich2003

OA

Articlegreen2003

Why do CEOs reciprocally sit on each other's boards?

Eliezer M. Fich · Lawrence J. White

244 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Corporate Finance

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Corporate Finance and Governance Political Influence and Corporate Strategies Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism

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References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1973The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities 1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm 1993The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems 1973Theory of Rational Option Pricing 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property 2005Theory of rational option pricing 1996Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors

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2008Who Monitors the Monitor? The Effect of Board Independence on Executive Compensation and Firm Value 2017Corporate governance, board networks and growth in domestic and international markets: Evidence from India 2008The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey 2011Acquisitions and CEO power: Evidence from French networks 2011Board Task‐related Faultlines and Firm Performance: A Decade of Evidence 2011

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Details

Year2003

Typearticle

Published2003-12-05

VenueJournal of Corporate Finance

ISSN-L0929-1199

Languageen

Citations244

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

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doi10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2003.06.002

openalex_workW3124115461

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2017Corporate governance: evidence from Islamic banks

2008Are Interlocked Directors Effective Monitors?