Articlegreen2006

Managing Stock Option Expense: The Manipulation of Option‐Pricing Model Assumptions*

69 citations0/0 files storedContemporary Accounting Research

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Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Accounting Theory and Financial Reporting Accounting and Organizational Management

Abstract

Abstract This paper examines whether firms that voluntarily recognize stock option expense in their financial statements manage that expense downward more than firms that do not recognize the expense by adjusting option‐pricing model assumptions. To examine this issue, I collect option‐pricing model assumptions from fiscal year 2002 for both a sample of firms that voluntarily recognize stock option expense (“recognizing firms”) and a sample of control firms that do not (“disclosing firms”). The empirical results suggest that recognizing firms manage the recognized stock‐based compensation expense reported in their financial statements downward more than do firms that only disclose the expense. Additional analyses reveal that recognizing firms assume a lower level of volatility than disclosing firms in the option‐pricing model calculations; however, I find no evidence that recognizing firms manage the dividend yield and risk‐free interest rate assumptions more than disclosing firms. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recently issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123(R), which requires the expensing of the fair value of stock options, so these results may be of interest to capital‐market participants and the FASB as they assess the reliability of stock option expense as determined by option‐pricing models.

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References

1973The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities 1999A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting 2002Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management 1984Methodological Issues Related to the Estimation of Financial Distress Prediction Models 1990Positive Accounting Theory: A Ten Year Perspective.1999The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels 1988Evidence of Earnings Management from the Provision for Bad Debts 2002Empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking

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