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Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
12 references·6 citing·40 second hop
Informational Size and Efficient Auctions (2004)Informational Size and Efficient AuctionsImplementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information (2008)Implementation, contracts, an…Implementation in Bayesian equilibrium: the multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design (2008)Implementation in Bayesian eq…Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility (2002)Informational Size and Incent…Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations (2001)Efficient Design with Interde…Efficient Auctions (2000)Efficient AuctionsEfficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions (2000)Efficiency and Information Ag…Correlated Information and Mecanism Design (1992)Correlated Information and Me…Auctions and Privatization (1992)Auctions and PrivatizationFull Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions (1988)Full Extraction of the Surplu…Implementation in differential information economies (1986)Implementation in differentia…Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent (1985)Optimal Selling Strategies un…A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)A Theory of Auctions and Comp…Full Implementation and Belief Restrictions (2017)Full Implementation and Belie…Aggregation of expert opinions (2008)Aggregation of expert opinionsIndividually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus (2007)Individually rational, budget…Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction (2006)Mechanism Design with Interde…Ex post implementation in environments with private goods (2006)Ex post implementation in env…Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms (2005)Allocative and Informational …COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Optimal Auction Design (1981)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Field Experiments (2004)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions (2001)Chapter 5 Implementation theory (2002)Fault Tolerant Implementation (2002)Information and Competitive Price Systems (1976)A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition (1977)Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions (1999)Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study (2002)Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions (2008)Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers (1984)Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents (1990)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization (2006)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Agreeing to Disagree (1976)Strategy-Proof Exchange (1995)On Group Stability in Hierarchies and Networks (2004)Incentives in Teams (1973)Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design (2002)Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords (2006)An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions (2005)An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities (2006)Determinants of Privatization Prices (1997)Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders (2001)Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation (2006)Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation (2000)Incentives and Political Economy (2001)PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2004)Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method (2005)Make Trade Not War? (2008)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1982A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding3,770 cited
  • 1988Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions895 cited
  • 1985Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent586 cited
  • 2001Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations483 cited
  • 1992Correlated Information and Mecanism Design408 cited
  • 2000Efficient Auctions288 cited
  • 1986Implementation in differential information economies244 cited
  • 1992Auctions and Privatization232 cited
  • 2008Implementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information213 cited
  • 2000Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions141 cited
  • 2002Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility114 cited
  • 2008Implementation in Bayesian equilibrium: the multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design92 cited

Cited by

  • 2008Aggregation of expert opinions58 cited
  • 2005Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms58 cited
  • 2006Ex post implementation in environments with private goods50 cited

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  • 2017Full Implementation and Belief Restrictions49 cited
  • 2007Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus49 cited
  • 2006Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction46 cited