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Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction · Study

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ArticleMechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction

Claudio Mezzetti2006

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Articlegreen2006

Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction

Claudio Mezzetti

46 citations·0/0 files stored·Economic Theory

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

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References

1981Optimal Auction Design 1988Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions 1986Multistage Games with Communication 1985Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent 2001Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 1992Correlated Information and Mecanism Design 2003The relevance of private information in mechanism design 2004Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency

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2009Learning about the Future and Dynamic Efficiency

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2005Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanismsreport · 7 shared references 2007Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplusarticle · 7 shared references 2003The relevance of private information in mechanism designarticle · 5 shared references 2004Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiencyarticle · 5 shared references 2005On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Designarticle · 5 shared references 2003The effectiveness of English auctionsarticle · 5 shared references

Details

Year2006

Typearticle

Published2006-04-20

VenueEconomic Theory

ISSN-L0938-2259

Languageen

Citations46

Files0 public / 0

ShelfAuction Theory and Applications

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doi10.1007/s00199-006-0104-8

openalex_workW2071208786

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