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Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction

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References

1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
1988Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions895 cited
1986Multistage Games with Communication588 cited
1985Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent586 cited
2001Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations483 cited
1992Correlated Information and Mecanism Design408 cited
2003The relevance of private information in mechanism design158 cited
2004Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency141 cited
2004Informational Size and Efficient Auctions59 cited

Cited by

2009Learning about the Future and Dynamic Efficiency42 cited
2010Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems38 cited

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