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Empty voting and the efficiency of corporate governance · Study

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ArticleEmpty voting and the efficiency of corporate governance

Alon P. Brav2010

OA

Articlegreen2010

Empty voting and the efficiency of corporate governance

Alon P. Brav · Richmond D. Mathews

106 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Financial Economics

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Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Markets and Investment Strategies Financial Analysis and Corporate Governance

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References

1986Large Shareholders and Corporate Control 1997Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm 2008Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance 1998Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control?1988One share-one vote and the market for corporate control 2009Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia 1989Private benefits from control of public corporations 2009The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice

Cited by

2017Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶This article was prepared for the Elsevier Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance. We thank the editors, Ben Hermalin and Mike Weisbach, for inviting us to write this chapter. We thank Bo Becker, Amil Dasgupta, Doron Levit, Song Ma, Devin Reilly, Ed Rock, Fenghua Song, David Yermack, and especially Øyvind Bøhren for comments, and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, and Tom Schneider for research assistance.2023Trading and Shareholder Democracy 2021Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance 2014External audit quality and ownership structure: interaction and impact on earnings management of industrial and commercial Tunisian sectors

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2013Blockholders and Corporate Governancereport · 16 shared references 2017Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶This article was prepared for the Elsevier Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance. We thank the editors, Ben Hermalin and Mike Weisbach, for inviting us to write this chapter. We thank Bo Becker, Amil Dasgupta, Doron Levit, Song Ma, Devin Reilly, Ed Rock, Fenghua Song, David Yermack, and especially Øyvind Bøhren for comments, and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, and Tom Schneider for research assistance.chapter · 16 shared references 2016Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidencepreprint · 15 shared references 2013Blockholders and Corporate Governancepreprint · 15 shared references 2021Institutional Investors and Corporate Governancearticle · 14 shared references 2020Institutional Investors and Corporate Governancepreprint · 14 shared references

Details

Year2010

Typearticle

Published2010-10-14

VenueJournal of Financial Economics

ISSN-L0304-405X

Languageen

Citations106

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

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doi10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.10.005

openalex_workW3124464265

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2019Blockholder voting

2020Informed Trading in the Stock Market and Option-Price Discovery

2020Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance

2021The Corporate Objective Revisited: The Shareholder Perspective