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Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediaries
16 references·2 citing·43 second hop
Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediaries (2007)Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediar…American Economic Review (2019)American Economic ReviewOptimal auction design under non-commitment (2015)Optimal auction design under …Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions? (2009)Why Do Sellers (Usually) Pref…Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1 (2006)Sequentially Optimal Mechanis…Competing Auctions (2004)Competing AuctionsWhat Really Matters in Auction Design (2002)What Really Matters in Auctio…Bargaining with Incomplete Information (2001)Bargaining with Incomplete In…Vickrey Auctions in Practice: From Nineteenth-Century Philately to Twenty-First-Century E-Commerce (2000)Vickrey Auctions in Practice:…Sequentially Optimal Auctions (1997)Sequentially Optimal AuctionsAuctions Versus Negotiations (1996)Auctions Versus NegotiationsWhy Are Vickrey Auctions Rare? (1990)Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?Investment-banking contracts in tender offers (1990)Investment-banking contracts …Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco (1989)Barbarians at the Gate: The F…Collusion and the Choice of Auction (1985)Collusion and the Choice of A…Durable-Goods Monopolists (1982)Durable-Goods MonopolistsDistortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem (1981)Distortion of Utilities and t…Bid Takers or Market Makers? The Effect of Auctioneers on Auction Outcome (2016)Bid Takers or Market Makers? …AUCTION DESIGN WITHOUT COMMITMENT (2013)AUCTION DESIGN WITHOUT COMMIT…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market (1999)Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey (2003)Auctions: Theory and Practice (2004)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Large Shareholders and Corporate Control (1986)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)One size does not fit all: Selling firms to private equity versus strategic acquirers (2012)When Should Sellers Use Auctions? (2013)The Microstructure of Housing Markets (2015)The Theory of Industrial Organization (1988)Theory of Industrial Organization. (1989)Optimal Auction with Resale (2002)Detecting Large-Scale Collusion in Procurement Auctions (2014)Auctions and Bidding (1986)Auctions and Bidding: A Primer (1989)Emerging multiple issue e-auctions (2003)The Bidder's Curse (2011)Credible Auctions: A Trilemma (2020)Auctions and Auctioneering (1967)A Dynamic Theory of Countervailing Power (1996)Incentives and Political Economy (2001)Combinatorial Auction Design (2003)The Problem of Social Cost (1960)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers (2003)Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults, self-cures and securitization (2013)Farmer Bargaining Power and Market Information Services (2014)Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation (1980)Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis (2008)Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (2014)Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2017)Modeling Competitive Bidding: A Critical Essay (1994)AUCTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION (1996)Managing Online Auctions: Current Business and Research Issues (2003)An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence (1986)Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction (1986)Channel leadership, performance and coordination in closed loop supply chains (2013)Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers (1984)The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage (1998)The Promise of Entrepreneurship as a Field of Research (2000)
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References

  • 2019American Economic Review10,902 cited
  • 2002What Really Matters in Auction Design982 cited
  • 1982Durable-Goods Monopolists888 cited
  • 1996Auctions Versus Negotiations809 cited
  • 1990Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?383 cited
  • 1985Collusion and the Choice of Auction290 cited
  • 2001Bargaining with Incomplete Information230 cited
  • 2009Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?179 cited
  • 2000Vickrey Auctions in Practice: From Nineteenth-Century Philately to Twenty-First-Century E-Commerce150 cited
  • 1997Sequentially Optimal Auctions149 cited
  • 1990Investment-banking contracts in tender offers140 cited
  • 1989Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco137 cited
  • 2006Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1129 cited
  • 1981Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem110 cited
  • 2004Competing Auctions92 cited
  • 2015Optimal auction design under non-commitment70 cited

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  • 2013

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AUCTION DESIGN WITHOUT COMMITMENT
38 cited
  • 2016Bid Takers or Market Makers? The Effect of Auctioneers on Auction Outcome34 cited