Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies

Abstract

A new framework for games in continuous time is proposed. The continuous-time model conforms as closely as possible to the conventional discrete-time framework. Indeed, continuous time is viewed as "discrete time, but with a grid that is infinitely fine." The paper presents several examples illustrating the difficulties that arise in continuous-time game theory. Theorems relate the equilibria of continuous time games to the equilibria of approximating discrete time games. A variety of industrial organization applications are studied, yielding sharp predictions. Applications include continuously repeated games, preemption models, and patent races. Copyright 1989 by The Econometric Society.

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