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Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability
11 references·5 citing·44 second hop
Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability (2005)Hierarchies of belief and interim rationa…Topologies on Types (2005)Topologies on TypesRobust Mechanism Design (2005)Robust Mechanism DesignGames with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Games with Incomplete Informa…Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games (1999)Hierarchies of Conditional Be…Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs (1998)Topology-Free Typology of Bel…Common Priors: A Reply to Gul (1998)Common Priors: A Reply to GulA Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View (1998)A Comment on Aumann's Bayesia…Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge (1993)Hierarchies of Beliefs and Co…Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality (1987)Correlated Equilibrium as an …Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information (1985)Formulation of Bayesian analy…Rationalizable Strategic Behavior (1984)Rationalizable Strategic Beha…Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games (2020)Sentiments, strategic uncerta…Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information (2011)Interactive Epistemology and …On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information (2009)On redundant types and Bayesi…Intrinsic correlation in games (2007)Intrinsic correlation in gamesInterim Bayesian Nash Equilibrium on Universal Type Spaces for Supermodular Games (2007)Interim Bayesian Nash Equilib…Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity (1989)A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms (1999)Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity (2004)Epistemic Game Theory (2014)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points (1968)Dynamic psychological games (2008)The Bargaining Problem (1950)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)A value for n -person games (1988)Characterizing Common Priors in the Form of Posteriors (2000)Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis (2004)On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design (2005)Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1945)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities (1990)Foundations of Social Evolution (1998)A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (2000)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Job Market Signaling (1973)An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining (1982)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)The Grammar of Society (2005)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games (1987)Non-cooperative games (1989)Voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponent (1990)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Games and Decisions (2015)The relevance of private information in mechanism design (2003)Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (2016)Fragility of asymptotic agreement under Bayesian learning (2016)Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection (1984)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory (1999)Rationalization and Incomplete Information (2003)Admissibility in Games (2008)Agreeing to Disagree (1976)Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption (2003)An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015)Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design (2019)Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords (2006)Robustness and Linear Contracts (2015)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2004Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model2,127 cited
  • 1987Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality1,613 cited
  • 1984Rationalizable Strategic Behavior1,292 cited
  • 1985Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information774 cited
  • 2005Robust Mechanism Design616 cited
  • 1993Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge443 cited
  • 1999Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games220 cited
  • 1998A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View162 cited
  • 1998Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs152 cited
  • 1998Common Priors: A Reply to Gul131 cited
  • 2005Topologies on Types103 cited

Cited by

  • 2007Intrinsic correlation in games48 cited
  • 2007Interim Bayesian Nash Equilibrium on Universal Type Spaces for Supermodular Games40 cited
  • 2009On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information38 cited
  • 2011Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information38 cited
  • 2020

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Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games
21 cited