Contested Boundaries: Ambiguity and Creativity in the Evolution of German Codetermination

Abstract

Abstract Institutions are commonly seen as formal and informal ‘rules of the game’ that provide economic agents with incentives and constraints, and thereby induce stable patterns of behavior.1 Institutional constraints from political, legal, and social environments often lead to institutional isomorphism whereby organizations adopt similar structures and routines (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Institutional theory has thus offered powerful explanations of why organizations have diverse responses to similar economic pressures. Conversely, institutions may present comparative advantages for different types of activities (Streeck 1992; Whitley 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001). These insights have laid a valuable foundation for international comparisons of business, corporate governance, or industrial relations.

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