Market Liquidity, Investor Participation, and Managerial Autonomy: Why Do Firms Go Private?

Arnoud W. A. Boot · Radhakrishnan Gopalan · Anjan V. Thakor

116 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Finance

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Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Markets and Investment Strategies Private Equity and Venture Capital

Abstract

ABSTRACT We focus on public‐market investor participation to analyze the firm's decision to stay public or go private. The liquidity of public ownership is both a blessing and a curse: It lowers the cost of capital, but also introduces volatility in a firm's shareholder base, exposing management to uncertainty regarding shareholder intervention in management decisions, thereby affecting the manager's perceived decision‐making autonomy and curtailing managerial inputs. We extract predictions about how investor participation affects stock price level and volatility and the public firm's incentives to go private, providing a link between investor participation and firm participation in public markets.

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References

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