Efficiency of Sarbanes-Oxley act: willingness-to-comply and agency problems

Michael C. I. Nwogugu

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Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Corporate Finance and Governance Regulation and Compliance Studies

Abstract

This article analyzes the efficiency of the Sarbanes Oxley law within the context of large corporate transactions. The article introduces new models of Willingess-To-Comply, and also presents various reasons for changes in the disclosure and accounting requirements.

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2001Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature 2004Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity 2001Essays on disclosure 1999Accounting for the effects of accountability.2000The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure 2003Limited attention, information disclosure, and financial reporting 1999The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure 2001Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature

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