Family control, agency conflicts, corporate cash holdings and firm value

Abstract

Purpose This paper examines whether family control exerts any influence on corporate cash holdings in Indian listed firms. It also examines how this accumulated cash of family firms impacts firm value. Design/methodology/approach The study uses dynamic panel data regression estimated using two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) on S&P BSE 500 firms during 2009–2018 for testing the repercussions of family control on the cash levels of a firm. Further, fixed effects regression has been employed for the valuation analysis. Findings Estimation results showed that family control negatively impacts cash holdings in Indian firms. Further, the cash accumulation by family firms adversely affects the market valuation of the firm. These findings signal a principal–principal (P-P) agency conflict in Indian family firms, i.e. friction between family owners and minority shareholders' interests. Minority shareholders fear that a part of the cash reserves will be used by family members for personal benefits. Thus, they discount cash reserves in family firms. Originality/value The study adds to the determinants of corporate cash holdings in emerging markets. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study from India investigating family control as a determinant of cash policy. It sheds light on the P-P agency conflict in Indian family firms. P-P agency conflict is less researched in cash holdings literature as opposed to the principal–agent managerial disputes. Also, the study uses a more comprehensive definition of family control rather than just considering the ownership as used in prior cash holding research.

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