To understand the implications of different aid modalities, we need to analyse the bargaining logic between donors and recipient governments*

Abstract

Budget support has given rise to vigorous debates among practitioners and academics.Scholars have sought to analyse why this aid modality was adopted (e.g.Clist et al., 2012;Dietrich, 2013); whether or not it is effective (e.g.Dijkstra, 2018; Koeberle et al., 2006; IDD and Associates, 2006;Ronsholt, 2014); and under what conditions it is likely to be abandoned and/or suspended (e.g.Koch et al., 2017;Molenaers et al., 2015).Beyond budget support itself, these debates raise important questions about why donors and recipients favour specific aid modalities, and the impact of their choices on development policy.Dijkstra critically engages with our article "The rise and fall of budget support: Ownership, bargaining and donor commitment problems in foreign aid" (Swedlund & Lierl, 2020), published as a part of a special issue on "Ownership in a post-aid effectiveness era: Comparative perspectives", guest-edited by Niels Keijzer and David Black.We appreciate the discussion of our work and the evolving debate, which will help to advance our understanding of different aid modalities and their implications for development policy.In Swedlund and Lierl (2020), we argue that the key to understanding the implications of budget support for development policy priorities is the underlying bargaining logic between donor agencies

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