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Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics
16 references·3 citing·38 second hop
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References

  • 1960The Problem of Social Cost18,598 cited
  • 1966The Logic of Collective Action.11,371 cited
  • 2001The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation10,285 cited
  • 1986The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration9,369 cited
  • 1995Corruption and Growth8,813 cited
  • 2003Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage7,538 cited
  • 1981A Rational Theory of the Size of Government5,485 cited
  • 1990Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm5,407 cited
  • 1982Structure and Change in Economic History.4,235 cited
  • 1983A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence4,118 cited
  • 1974Toward a Theory of Property Rights3,871 cited
  • 2002Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy3,772 cited
  • 1991Charles Tilly. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990. (Studies in Social Discontinuity.) Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell. 1990. Pp. xi, 269. $34.953,165 cited
  • 1986Incumbent performance and electoral control2,175 cited
  • 2000Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective1,981 cited

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  • 1989Bargaining in Legislatures1,978 cited
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    • 2005Unbundling Institutions2,620 cited
    • 2003The New Comparative Economics283 cited
    • 2005Institutions matter, but which ones?227 cited