Single-Leader-Multiple-Followers Stackelberg Security Game With Hypergame Framework

Zhaoyang Cheng · Guanpu Chen · Yiguang Hong

40 citations0/0 files storedIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

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Game Theory and Applications Information and Cyber Security Smart Grid Security and Resilience

Abstract

In this paper, we employ a hypergame framework to analyze the single-leader-multiple-followers (SLMF) Stackelberg security game with two typical misinformed situations: misperception and deception. We provide a stability criterion with the help of hyper Nash equilibrium (HNE) to investigate both strategic stability and cognitive stability of equilibria in SLMF games with misinformation. In fact, we find mild stable conditions such that the equilibria with misperception and deception can become HNE. Moreover, we discuss the robustness of the equilibria to reveal whether players have the ability to keep their profits under the influence of some misinformation.

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References

2011Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness 2002The Costs of Deception: Evidence from Psychology 2011Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness 2010Defending against multiple different attackers 2009Leadership games with convex strategy sets 2009Security Games with Incomplete Information 1988Modeling misperceptions in games 2018Modeling and Analysis of Leaky Deception Using Signaling Games With Evidence

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