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Loyal Leaders, Affluent Agencies: The Budgetary Implications of Political Appointments in the Executive Branch
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References

  • 1984The New Economics of Organization1,972 cited
  • 1999Delegating Powers1,054 cited
  • 1991The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy750 cited
  • 2011Distributive Politics Around the World577 cited
  • 2002On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments548 cited
  • 1984The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)503 cited
  • 2001T HEORIES OF D ELEGATION450 cited
  • 1985The New Direction in American Politics438 cited
  • 1996Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making404 cited
  • 2010The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending378 cited
  • 2002Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-Barrel Differ across Electoral Systems375 cited
  • 2016The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics372 cited
  • 2004Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform352 cited
  • 2007The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries337 cited
  • 2012Formal Models of Bureaucracy234 cited

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  • 2001Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy232 cited
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