Against hybrid theories of concepts

Abstract

Psychologists of concepts ’ traditional assumption that there are many properties common to all concepts has been subject to devastating critiques in psychology and in the philosophy of psychology. However, it is currently unclear what approach to concepts is best suited to replace this traditional assumption. In this article, we compare two competing approaches, the Heterogeneity Hypothesis and the hybrid theories of concepts, and we present an empirical argument that supports the former over the latter. Psychologists working on human higher cognitive competences (e.g., categorization, induction, analogy-making, etc.) have traditionally assumed that there are numerous properties common to all concepts and theories of concepts have attempted to characterize these common properties. There is however a growing consensus against this assumption in psychology (Medin, Lynch, & Solomon, 2000; (Murphy, 2002)) and in the

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