Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology

Abstract

This paper reviews some elements of contemporary reliabilism, a dominant epistemological theory, as is presented in the recent collection of essays Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology (2012) by a major epistemologist, Alvin I. Goldman.The focus is on Goldman's variant of process reliabilism as a theory of epistemic justification as well as some of the arguments he provided for this theory and its rivals.According to Goldman's process reliabilism, epistemic justification is a function of the reliability of the pertinent belief producing processes.This simple formula has been systematically developed by Goldman as a general theory of individual justified belief and knowledge.Goldman also extended his analysis in terms of reliable (truth-oriented, truth-conducive) belief production beyond the boundaries of individual epistemology into a veritistic social epistemology, formulating a general theory of social conditions of justification and knowledge as well as a theory of social knowledge.Two main themes from Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology are emphasized here: the structure of justification and the evidential role of intuitions.Concerning the latter topic, certain deviations from Goldman's original reliabilist position have been noticed and critically assessed.

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