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Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology
16 references·3 citing·29 second hop
Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology (2012)Reliabilism and Contemporary EpistemologyReliabilism and the Value of Knowledge (2009)Reliabilism and the Value of …PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS: THEIR TARGET, THEIR SOURCE, AND THEIR EPISTEMIC STATUS (2007)PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS: THE…The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good (2003)The Search for the Source of …Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge (2002)Basic Knowledge and the Probl…The Generality Problem for Reliabilism (1998)The Generality Problem for Re…Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy (1998)Intuition and the Autonomy of…Virtues of the Mind (1996)Virtues of the MindStrong and Weak Justification (1988)Strong and Weak JustificationAn internalist externalism (1988)An internalist externalismJustification and truth (1984)Justification and truthThe Raft and the Pyramid (1980)The Raft and the PyramidExternalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge (1980)Externalist Theories of Empir…What is Justified Belief? (1979)What is Justified Belief?Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge (1976)Discrimination and Perceptual…An Analysis of Factual Knowledge (1968)An Analysis of Factual Knowle…A Causal Theory of Knowing (1967)A Causal Theory of KnowingHigher-Order Evidence (2020)Higher-Order EvidenceJUSTIFIED GROUP BELIEF IS EVIDENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE GROUP BELIEF (2018)JUSTIFIED GROUP BELIEF IS EVI…Reliability for degrees of belief (2014)Reliability for degrees of be…Philosophical Explanations. (1983)Epistemology and Cognition (1987)The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (1988)Value, Reality, and Desire (2005)Justification without Awareness (2006)Normative Externalism (2019)Imagining as a Guide to Possibility (2010)The Intellectual Given (2015)CONTEXTUALISM, SUBJECT-SENSITIVE INVARIANTISM AND KNOWLEDGE OF KNOWLEDGE (2005)Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology (2012)Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions (2013)What Is "Naturalized Epistemology?" (1988)Metaepistemology and Skepticism (1990)Expanding the Dimensions of Epistemic Cognition: Arguments From Philosophy and Psychology (2011)Knowledge in a Social World (1999)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)Direction of Fit (1992)Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (1999)How to be a Moral Realist (2002)Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification (1994)Knowledge as Credit for True Belief (2003)Character as Moral Fiction (2013)Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission (1999)UNREASONABLE KNOWLEDGE (2010)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics (2020)On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse (1993)Epistemic Injustice (2007)The Epistemology of Resistance (2013)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1996Virtues of the Mind2,241 cited
  • 1976Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge1,883 cited
  • 1979What is Justified Belief?1,526 cited
  • 1967A Causal Theory of Knowing925 cited
  • 1984Justification and truth713 cited
  • 1980Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge582 cited
  • 2002Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge544 cited
  • 1980The Raft and the Pyramid450 cited
  • 1998The Generality Problem for Reliabilism410 cited
  • 1998Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy318 cited
  • 2007PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS: THEIR TARGET, THEIR SOURCE, AND THEIR EPISTEMIC STATUS317 cited
  • 2003The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good300 cited
  • 1988An internalist externalism288 cited
  • 1988Strong and Weak Justification287 cited
  • 1968An Analysis of Factual Knowledge252 cited
  • 2009Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge245 cited

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  • 2014Reliability for degrees of belief

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38 cited
  • 2018JUSTIFIED GROUP BELIEF IS EVIDENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE GROUP BELIEF38 cited
  • 2020Higher-Order Evidence25 cited