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Induction, Acceptance and Rational Belief
0 references·16 citing·48 second hop
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Cited by

  • 1991Two principles of Bayesian epistemology165 cited
  • 1994Conservatism in Epistemology154 cited
  • 1999The preface, the lottery, and the logic of belief104 cited
  • 2008Assertion, Moore, and Bayes94 cited
  • 2002A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability86 cited
  • 2008The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief81 cited
  • 2017Lying, risk and accuracy70 cited
  • 2020Credence: A Belief-First Approach70 cited
  • 1999Believing Conjunctions66 cited
  • 2005Degree-of-Belief and Degree-of-Support: Why Bayesians Need Both Notions63 cited
  • 2021Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs Are Justified56 cited
  • 2015Lotteries and justification50 cited
  • 1985Acceptance of empirical statements: A Bayesian theory without cognitive utilities49 cited
  • 2011Varieties of Bayesianism48 cited
  • 2008Defeasible Reasoning46 cited
  • 1979Justification and the Basis of Belief46 cited

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