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Abstract In countries with long‐standing agency traditions, the creation of new agencies rarely comes as a large‐scale reform but rather as one structural choice of many possible, most notably a ministerial division. In order to make sense of these choices, the article discusses the role ofpolitical design—focusing on the role of political motivations, such as ideological turnover, replacement risks and ideological stands toward administrative efficiency—andorganizational dynamics—focusing on the role of administrative legacies and existing organizational palettes. The article utilizes data on organizational creations in the Norwegian central state between 1947 and 2019, in order to explore how political design and organizational dynamics help us understand the creation of agencies relative to ministry divisions over time. We find that political motives matter a great deal for the structural choices made by consecutive Norwegian governments, but that structural path dependencies may also be at play.
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