Relational Primitivism

Ariel Zylberman

30 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Philosophical Ethics and Theory Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Abstract

Abstract What kind of property is represented by the moral ought? I defend a relational answer: the moral ought represents a primitive relational property of actions required by the original claims of persons. I argue that the relational answer offers a distinctive and compelling account in its own right that also avoids standard difficulties of familiar theories.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 30 citations exist upstream.

References

1971A Theory of Justice 1979Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.1996The Sources of Normativity 1955Are There Any Natural Rights?1999Kant's Ethical Thought 1913Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning 1999Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government.1994The Practice of Moral Judgment.

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.