Armed Servants

Peter Douglas Feaver

378 citations0/0 files storedHarvard University Press eBooks

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Military and Defense Studies Military History and Strategy Political Conflict and Governance

Abstract

How do civilians control the military? In his book, Feaver proposes a new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the “armed servants” of the nation-state.

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