Assessing Uncertainty

Abstract

Summary Intuitive judgments of probability are based on a limited number of heuristics that are usually effective but sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors. Research shows, for example, that people judge the probability of a hypothesis by the degree to which it represents the evidence, with little or no regard for its prior probability. Other heuristics lead to an overestimation of the probabilities of highly available or salient events, and to overconfidence in the assessment of subjective probability distributions. These biases are not readily corrected, and they are shared by both naive and statistically sophisticated subjects. The implications of the psychology of judgment to the analysis of rational behaviour are explored.

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