Neither Heroes nor Saints

Abstract

Abstract Most of us are far from perfect in virtue. Faced with this fact, moral philosophers can respond in two different ways. On the one hand they might insist that the only real virtue is perfect virtue, and the only right actions are perfectly virtuous ones. Any failure to meet the exacting standards of perfect virtue will amount to vice, and any less than perfectly virtuous actions will be wrong. On the other hand, and if they reject such a rigorist picture, they can instead affirm that there are actions that are truly good and right even if they fall short of perfection. This book urges the attractions of a virtue ethics that is committed to the second sort of picture. In doing so, it makes two major innovations. First, it constructs and defends neo-Aristotelian accounts of supererogation and suberogation. But just as important, and far from encouraging a kind of complacency, the recognition that there can be genuine goodness short of perfection is precisely what opens up theoretical space for appreciating the goodness of striving toward ideal virtue. Thus, the second major innovation this book makes is to show that self-improvement itself can be morally excellent, and that the disposition to seek and engage in it, where appropriate, can itself be a virtue.

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