A psychotherapist's lessons from the philosophy of science.

Abstract

A number of issues are discussed, but the major themes have to do with the way causation is understood in psychology, the resultant image of humanity as mechanical rather than teleological, and the fact that psychologists can and should be framing people as freely willing agents in their theories even as these views are submitted to rigorous empirical testing in the traditional scientific method. Although the scientific method unavoidably commits the fallacy of "affirming the consequent" in an if-then sequence of logical reasoning, the author opposes adopting substitutes for this approach to knowledge. Teleology needs to be furthered in psychotherapy because it is a genuinely accurate portrayal of human beings and because there is a pressing need for improvement in ethico-moral realms of behavior that mechanical models fail to capture.

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