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Evidentialism
0 references·16 citing·52 second hop
Evidentialism (2004)EvidentialismBeing neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment (2020)Being neutral: Agnosticism, i…An Epistemic Nonconsequentialism (2020)An Epistemic Nonconsequential…Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs (2019)Radical moral encroachment: T…Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment (2018)Evidentialism and Moral Encro…Equal treatment for belief (2018)Equal treatment for beliefBelieving for Practical Reasons (2018)Believing for Practical Reaso…Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality (2015)Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzl…THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM (2013)THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CO…Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions (2013)Epistemic Teleology and the S…Suspended judgment (2011)Suspended judgmentWHY OPEN-MINDED PEOPLE SHOULD ENDORSE DOGMATISM (2010)WHY OPEN-MINDED PEOPLE SHOULD…On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification (2010)On the Relationship between P…Virtue Epistemology (2008)Virtue EpistemologyHaving reasons (2007)Having reasonsEvidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief (2007)Evidentialism and pragmatic c…Justification without Awareness (2006)Justification without Awarene…Warrant: The Current Debate (1993)Mind and World (1994)The Skeptic and the Dogmatist (2000)Experience and Evidence (2013)Problems for Credulism (2013)The Border Between Seeing and Thinking (2023)A theory of justice original editionModern Moral Philosophy (1958)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)The Aptness of Anger (2017)There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes (2017)Reasons First (2021)What is Justified Belief? (1979)Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. (1988)Knowledge in Perspective (1991)The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion (2010)The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (2019)Knowledge in a Social World (1999)Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy (2017)A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief (2018)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. (1955)Philosophical Explanations. (1983)Warrant and Proper Function (1993)UNREASONABLE KNOWLEDGE (2010)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)The Theory of Epistemic Rationality (1987)Belief's Own Ethics (2002)From Normativity to Responsibility (2011)Can Pragmatists Be Moderate? (2020)Getting Things Right (2022)There are no epistemic norms of inquiry (2022)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)Knowledge in an Uncertain World (2009)Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal (2009)Beyond accuracy: Epistemic flaws with statistical generalizations (2019)Varieties of Moral Encroachment (2020)On statistical criteria of algorithmic fairness (2021)Elusive knowledge (1996)Motivated closing of the mind: "Seizing" and "freezing." (1996)Contemporary debates in epistemology (2005)Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry (2021)Inquiring Minds Want to Improve (2022)Why Double-Check? (2022)The Aim Of Belief (2002)Philosophical Perspectives (2003)Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities* (2015)Epistemology and Cognition (1987)Virtues of the Mind (1996)Epistemic Injustice (2007)ON THE EPISTEMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF EVIDENCE YOU SHOULD HAVE HAD (2016)Skill in epistemology I: Skill and knowledge (2016)Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology (2017)
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  • 2006Justification without Awareness504 cited
  • 2010On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification446 cited
  • 2013Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions336 cited
  • 2010WHY OPEN-MINDED PEOPLE SHOULD ENDORSE DOGMATISM291 cited
  • 2011Suspended judgment266 cited
  • 2019Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs237 cited
  • 2013THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM221 cited
  • 2008Virtue Epistemology205 cited
  • 2020Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment170 cited
  • 2018Believing for Practical Reasons168 cited
  • 2018Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment166 cited
  • 2007Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief164 cited
  • 2020An Epistemic Nonconsequentialism164 cited
  • 2015Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality161 cited
  • 2007Having reasons157 cited
  • 2018Equal treatment for belief

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154 cited