Buddhist Ethics

Abstract

This essay formulates an ethics based largely on Buddhist principles. However, it does so without assuming views for which, arguably, there is no real evidence, such as rebirth. In light of this, it is argued that the good for a Buddhist ethics plausible in a contemporary Western context cannot be simply a negative one, of eliminating suffering. The positive good to be promoted is that of peace of mind. We should be concerned to eliminate all troubled mental states, given Buddhist views that the distinction between myself and another has no substance. According to this formulation, therefore, morality is self-interest, universalized by a denial of the self. Some possible objections and replies are then considered. The hardest of these is that suffering may actually be a good sometimes.

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