Corporate Control and the Choice of Investment Financing: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions

Yakov Amihud A · Baruch Itamar Lev · Nickolaos G. Travlos

255 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Finance

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Markets and Investment Strategies Private Equity and Venture Capital

Abstract

We test the proposition that corporate control considerations motivate the means of investment financing—cash (and debt) or stock. Corporate insiders who value control will prefer financing investments by cash or debt rather than by issuing new stock which dilutes their holdings and increases the risk of losing control. Our empirical results support this hypothesis: in corporate acquisitions, the larger the managerial ownership fraction of the acquiring firm the more likely the use of cash financing. Also, the previously observed negative bidders' abnormal returns associated with stock financing are mainly in acquisitions made by firms with low managerial ownership.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 255 citations exist upstream.

References

1958The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment 1977DEBT AND TAXES*

Cited by

2011Family Control and Financing Decisions 1999Does corporate ownership structure affect its strategy towards diversification?1998Wealth creation versus wealth redistributions in pure stock-for-stock mergers1We are grateful to Tom Arnold, Sanjai Bhagat, James Bicksler, David Blackwell, Ekkehart Boehmer, Ted Bos, Robert Brokaw, Bill Carleton, Bob Comment, Chris Cornwell, Mary Dehner, Bob Eisenbeis, Jimmy Hilliard, Randy Howard, Steve Jones, Ed Kane, Josef Lakonishok, Larry Lang, Bill Lewellen, Marc Lipson, Paul Malatesta, Jeff Netter, Cathy Niden, Volker Pollmann, Annette Poulsen, Jay Ritter, Richard Ruback, Louis Scott, Joe Sinkey, Bill Schwert (the editor), Ralph Walkling (the referee), Ron Warren, J. Fred Weston, Karen Wruck, and seminar participants at the University of Arizona, the University of Delaware, the University of Illinois, the University of Georgia, the University of Miami, Seattle University, the 1995 European Finance Association, the 1996 Financial Management Association, and the 1996 American Finance Association meetings for their helpful comments and recommendations. We also gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided for this project by the University of Georgia Research Foundation. Finally, Steve Henry, Rick McKinney, David Quillian, and Ryan Vaughn provided vital assistance with data collection and assisted with data input.1 2016The effect of director experience on acquisition performance 2003Mitigating risk in international mergers and acquisitions: the role of contingent payouts 2001Are cash acquisitions associated with better postcombination operating performance than stock acquisitions?

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.