Political/Policy Uncertainty, Corporate Disclosure, and Information Asymmetry*

Abstract

ABSTRACT Political/policy uncertainty causes significant disruption to capital markets around the world. This review synthesizes recent studies on this topic and provides suggestions for future research in this fast‐growing area. Specifically, this review focuses on three areas of research: (i) the measurement of political/policy uncertainty, (ii) the impact of political/policy uncertainty on financial analysts' forecasts, and (iii) the impact of political/policy uncertainty on corporate disclosure. We find that political/policy uncertainty affects both corporate disclosures and financial analysts' forecasts and that these effects interact with information asymmetry in capital markets. Furthermore, we find that companies strategically change their disclosure practices during periods of heightened political/policy uncertainty.

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