Does CFO serving as board secretary matter for information disclosure? Evidence from China’s listed companies

Abstract

This paper explores whether duality in the chief financial officer’s (CFO’s) job role (i.e. also serving as board secretary) reduces information asymmetry through higher levels of information transparency, focusing on Chinese publicly listed companies from 2001 to 2018. Our findings reveal that CFOs serving as board secretaries contribute to greater information transparency. The positive effect of CFO duality on information transparency appears to be more pronounced in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and in firms whose CFO is female and have had a longer tenure. Knowledge of these impacts is critical to building appropriate investment strategies.

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