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How private equity-backed buyout contracts shape corporate governance
16 references·0 citing·44 second hopsampled
How private equity-backed buyout contracts shape corporate governance (2022)How private equity-backed buyout contract…Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity (2009)Leveraged Buyouts and Private…Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses (2004)Characteristics, Contracts, a…Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts (2003)Financial Contracting Theory …How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed (1997)How Costly is Financial (Not …A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)A Survey of Corporate Governa…A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital (1994)A Theory of Debt Based on the…An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting (1992)An Incomplete Contracts Appro…The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations (1990)The structure and governance …Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Property Rights and the Natur…Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review (1989)Agency Theory: An Assessment …The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)The Costs and Benefits of Own…Control: Organizational and Economic Approaches (1985)Control: Organizational and E…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)An Analysis of the Principal-…Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information (1979)Optimal incentive contracts w…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityTheory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Job Market Signaling (1973)Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle (1998)A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations (2002)Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors (1980)Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)EFFECTS OF HUMAN RESOURCE SYSTEMS ON MANUFACTURING PERFORMANCE AND TURNOVER. (1994)Between Trust and Control: Developing Confidence in Partner Cooperation in Alliances (1998)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Formal and Real Authority in Organizations (1997)Unbundling Institutions (2005)Towards a Theory of Ecosystems (2018)Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (1979)INSTRUMENTAL STAKEHOLDER THEORY: A SYNTHESIS OF ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1995)Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness (2007)Opinion Paper: “So what if ChatGPT wrote it?” Multidisciplinary perspectives on opportunities, challenges and implications of generative conversational AI for research, practice and policy (2023)The Problem of Social Cost (1960)Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives (1991)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead (2000)The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach (1977)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (1995)What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data (1995)EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND EMPIRICAL WORK* (1970)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)An Integrative Model Of Organizational Trust (1995)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)Investor protection and corporate governance (2000)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Agency Relationships in Marketing: A Review of the Implications and Applications of Agency and Related Theories (1992)Organizational Learning from Performance Feedback (2003)
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References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1997A Survey of Corporate Governance16,237 cited
  • 1989Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review13,327 cited
  • 1986The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration9,369 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1990Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm5,407 cited
  • 1990The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations2,609 cited
  • 1992An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting2,132 cited
  • 1983An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem2,127 cited
  • 1985Control: Organizational and Economic Approaches2,023 cited
  • 2003Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts1,676 cited
  • 1994A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital1,441 cited
  • 1997How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed1,258 cited
  • 2004Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses1,173 cited
  • 2009Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity

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  • 1979Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information942 cited
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