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Epistemic justification: essays in the theory of knowledge
0 references·16 citing·58 second hopsampled
Epistemic justification: essays in the theory of knowledge (1990)Epistemic justification: essays in the th…The Mismeasure of the Self (2021)The Mismeasure of the SelfTransparency and Self-Knowledge (2018)Transparency and Self-Knowled…Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style (2016)Justified Belief: Knowledge F…Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge? (2014)Is Probabilistic Evidence a S…XV-The Russellian Retreat (2013)XV-The Russellian RetreatTHE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM (2013)THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CO…Friendship and epistemic norms (2012)Friendship and epistemic normsHegelian Metaphysics (2009)Hegelian MetaphysicsAssertion and its Constitutive Norms (2009)Assertion and its Constitutiv…Doxastic freedom (2007)Doxastic freedomIt Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non‐Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony (2006)It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond…The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (2004)The Oxford Handbook of Ration…Skeptical Arguments (2004)Skeptical ArgumentsEpistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign* (2004)Epistemic Circularity: Malign…Truth as the Epistemic Goal (2001)Truth as the Epistemic GoalThe Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation (2000)The Causal-Doxastic Theory of…A theory of justice original editionSpeech Acts (1969)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and suberogatory assertion (2013)The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion (2013)Problems with Norms of Assertion (2015)Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. (1988)Unskilled and unaware of it: How difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. (1999)The Theory of Moral Sentiments (2010)II—What’s Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action (2016)On the special insult of refusing testimony (2017)Against epistemic partiality in friendship: value-reflecting reasons (2018)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. (1955)Warrant and Proper Function (1993)Warranted Christian Belief (2000)Learning from Words* (2006)Wittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing (2011)Knowledge and Presuppositions (2014)Modern Moral Philosophy (1958)Knowledge in a Social World (1999)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy (2017)A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief (2018)An Epistemic Nonconsequentialism (2020)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Assertion: A Function First Account (2016)Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology (2017)Theory of inquiry (2020)Constants across cultures in the face and emotion. (1971)Self-Perception Theory (1972)Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. (1977)On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect (2020)Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence) (2021)On Believing (2022)An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690)The Taming of Chance (1990)The Philosophy of Philosophy (2007)Textual Embodiments of BourdieusianHexis (2013)On the Concept of Perezhivanie: A Quest for a Critical Review (2017)The Imagination in German Idealism and Romanticism (2019)Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behavior (1985)The case for motivated reasoning. (1990)Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. (1992)The essence of arrogance: A phenomenology of musical egotism (2022)Intellectual humility: A no‐distraction account (2023)Egotism, Elitism, and the Ethics of Musical Humility (2025)Philosophical Explanations. (1983)Elusive knowledge (1996)Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge (2008)Internalist Responses to Skepticism (2009)Epistemic Angst (2016)An essay concerning human understanding, 1690. (1948)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)Epistemology and Cognition. (1989)Curiosity was Framed* (2010)What do we Aim At When we Believe? (2011)Teleological epistemology (2018)
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  • 2013THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM221 cited
  • 2018Transparency and Self-Knowledge215 cited
  • 2004Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign*178 cited
  • 2001Truth as the Epistemic Goal159 cited
  • 2016Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style139 cited
  • 2009Assertion and its Constitutive Norms135 cited
  • 2021The Mismeasure of the Self135 cited
  • 2009Hegelian Metaphysics125 cited
  • 2004Skeptical Arguments110 cited
  • 2012Friendship and epistemic norms109 cited
  • 2013XV-The Russellian Retreat108 cited
  • 2004The Oxford Handbook of Rationality108 cited
  • 2000The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation104 cited
  • 2007Doxastic freedom103 cited
  • 2006It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non‐Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony101 cited
  • 2014Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?86 cited

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