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The calculus of american indian consent: the law and economics of tribal constitutions
16 references·0 citing·49 second hop
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References

  • 1983A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence4,118 cited
  • 2003Public Choice III1,783 cited
  • 1988One share-one vote and the market for corporate control1,342 cited
  • 2019Text as Data1,260 cited
  • 1970The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource589 cited
  • 2008Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics558 cited
  • 2011American Indian politics and the American political system287 cited
  • 2000Where’s the glue? Institutional and cultural foundations of American Indian economic development199 cited
  • 2014Forced Coexistence and Economic Development: Evidence From Native American Reservations187 cited
  • 2010Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments140 cited
  • 1976The Sizes of Legislatures118 cited
  • 1995WHERE DOES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REALLY COME FROM? CONSTITUTIONAL RULE AMONG THE CONTEMPORARY SIOUX AND APACHE95 cited
  • 2008Sovereignty, Credible Commitments, and Economic Prosperity on American Indian Reservations89 cited
  • 1990The Allocation of Resources by Voting86 cited
  • 2009The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract

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81 cited
  • 1990Government as Definer of Property Rights: Indian Lands, Ethnic Externalities, and Bureaucratic Budgets69 cited
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