On commitment to untruthful implicatures

Abstract

Abstract In the current debate on the lying-misleading distinction, many theorists distinguish between lying as insincere assertion and misleading through conveying an untruthful implicature. There is growing empirical evidence that average speakers count untruthful implicatures as cases of lying. What matters for them is the (degree) of commitment to an untruthful implicature. Since untruthful conversational implicatures may arise with non-assertions, and untruthful presuppositions are also judged as lying, a realistic conception of lying should aim at a definition of lying that it is able to cover these possibilities. Such a conception, which supports traditional assumptions about the semantics-pragmatics distinction, leads to a commitment-based definition of lying, as recently proposed by a number of authors.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 15 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.