On selling format choice and quality differentiation in dual‐channel supply chains

Abstract

Abstract When suppliers sell products through a direct channel and an indirect channel, they usually differentiate the two channels by quality to alleviate channel conflicts. The quality choice for different channels poses a great challenge to the suppliers, which also bears implications for the online retailer's choice between the reselling format and the agency format. This paper uses a game‐theoretic model to investigate the interaction between the supplier's quality differentiation strategy and the online retailer's selling format choice in dual‐channel supply chains. Different from the previous literature, we endogenize the supplier's quality decisions and find that the supplier always chooses to sell the high‐quality product through the direct channel and sell the low‐quality product through the online retailer. Moreover, compared with the reselling format, the quality level of the low‐quality product is reduced but that of the high‐quality product is lightly increased under the agency format. The intuition is that the supplier tends to highlight the advantage of each channel to acquire more profit. Regardless of the supplier's choice, the online retailer always prefers the agency format. We further extend our model in several important directions, which lend robustness to our core insights.

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