In the shadow of hierarchy: minimum wage commissions in the UK and Germany

Abstract

Abstract The adoption of statutory minimum wages (MWs) has been accompanied by institutional innovations in the relationship between governments, employers and unions. In the UK and Germany, MW commissions were created to recommend or determine the MW. Their memberships are dominated by trade unionists and employers. Structures that engage the social partners ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’ can be efficient as well as politically expedient. They will be stable if, first, the social partners can establish a consensual basis for decisions and, second, this consensus position is near enough to the government’s position not to trigger intervention. The first condition has been met but not the second: both in the UK and Germany, governments have overridden employers and unions in order to introduce higher MWs. The article explores why this has happened and draws out the implications for MW fixing and the stability of shadow-of-hierarchy arrangements.

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