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Morality of Belief II: Three Challenges and An Extension
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Morality of Belief II: Three Challenges and An Extension (2023)Morality of Belief II: Three Challenges a…Varieties of Moral Encroachment (2020)Varieties of Moral Encroachme…What we epistemically owe to each other (2019)What we epistemically owe to …Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs (2019)Radical moral encroachment: T…The wrongs of racist beliefs (2018)The wrongs of racist beliefsProbabilistic Knowledge (2018)Probabilistic KnowledgePragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology (2018)Pragmatic Encroachment in Epi…IX—Moral Encroachment (2018)IX—Moral EncroachmentPragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment (2017)Pragmatic Encroachment and Mo…Inquiry and Belief (2017)Inquiry and BeliefOxford Studies in Normative Ethics (2013)Oxford Studies in Normative E…Belief, credence, and norms (2013)Belief, credence, and normsOn the epistemic costs of implicit bias (2011)On the epistemic costs of imp…The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James’ ‘Will To Believe’ (2010)The Epistemic Value of Moral …Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life (2005)Responsibility for Attitudes:…Involuntary Sins (1985)Involuntary SinsPhilosophical Perspectives (1963)Philosophical PerspectivesThe Principles of Psychology (1891)The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. (1956)The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. (1994)The Ugly Truth About Ourselves and Our Robot Creations: The Problem of Bias and Social Inequity (2017)Vices of the Mind (2019)Algorithmic bias: Senses, sources, solutions (2021)Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (1998)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations (2018)Normative Externalism (2019)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives? (1978)The Importance of What We Care About (1988)Control, responsibility, and moral assessment (2006)Responsibility for believing (2006)Alief in Action (and Reaction) (2008)The Complete Works of Aristotle the Revised Oxford Translation (1984)The psychology of curiosity: A review and reinterpretation. (1994)Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises (1998)The relationship between belief and credence (2020)Inquiring Minds Want to Improve (2022)The aim of inquiry? (2023)Predicting ethnic and racial discrimination: A meta-analysis of IAT criterion studies. (2013)Racism without racists: color-blind racism and the persistence of racial inequality in America (2013)Blindspot: hidden biases of good people (2014)Real Talk on the Metaphysics of Gender (2018)Moral encroachment and reasons of the wrong kind (2019)Epistemic blame (2021)Knowledge in an Uncertain World (2009)Beyond accuracy: Epistemic flaws with statistical generalizations (2019)How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment (2019)The Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge (2024)Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal (2009)On statistical criteria of algorithmic fairness (2021)Plural and Conflicting Values (1992)Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion (2003)Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (2003)How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality (1993)Thinking about Consciousness (2002)Simulating Minds (2006)
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References

  • 2005Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life894 cited
  • 2011On the epistemic costs of implicit bias519 cited
  • 2018Probabilistic Knowledge446 cited
  • 1963Philosophical Perspectives403 cited
  • 2013Belief, credence, and norms384 cited
  • 1985Involuntary Sins328 cited
  • 2017Inquiry and Belief268 cited
  • 2018The wrongs of racist beliefs240 cited
  • 2019Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs237 cited
  • 2018Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology207 cited
  • 2019What we epistemically owe to each other201 cited
  • 2010The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James’ ‘Will To Believe’197 cited
  • 2013Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics195 cited
  • 2018IX—Moral Encroachment179 cited
  • 2020Varieties of Moral Encroachment162 cited
  • 2017Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment151 cited

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