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Central Bank Independence: The Case of North African Central Banks
16 references·0 citing·38 second hopsampled
Central Bank Independence: The Case of North African Central Banks (2023)Central Bank Independence: The Case of No…Is There Any Link between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean (2008)Is There Any Link between Leg…Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions — Past, present and future (2008)Central bank independence and…Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from Global Trends (2007)Central Bank Autonomy: Lesson…Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators (2003)Economic growth and judicial …Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies—an international perspective (2002)Central bank reform, liberali…Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence (2001)Central Bank Independence: An…Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence (1995)Political Influence on the Ce…Central-Bank Independence Revisited (1995)Central-Bank Independence Rev…Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence (1993)Central Bank Independence and…Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes (1992)Measuring the Independence of…CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (1992)CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIB…Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries (1991)Political and Monetary Instit…Macroeconomics and Politics (1988)Macroeconomics and PoliticsThe Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target (1985)The Optimal Degree of Commitm…Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy (1983)Rules, Discretion and Reputat…Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans (1977)Rules Rather than Discretion:…The Political Business Cycle (1975)An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (2003)The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective (1999)INTEREST AND PRICES: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF MONETARY POLICY (2005)Monetary Policy Strategy: Lessons from the Crisis (2011)Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set (2016)On the Determination of the Public Debt (1979)Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies (1989)Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism (1995)Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics (2012)An Economic Theory of Democracy (1960)A Rational Theory of the Size of Government (1981)Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union (1998)Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence (1992)Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule (1977)A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model (1981)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)International Norm Dynamics and Political Change (1998)Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements (1961)Capital Theory and Investment Behavior (1963)On Second-Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium Growth (1968)Macroeconomics and Reality (1980)Discretion versus policy rules in practice (1993)Unemployment: macroeconomic performance and the labour market (1992)Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets (1997)Central bank mandates, sustainability objectives and the promotion of green finance (2021)Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy (1983)The quality of government (1999)Chapter 8 Growth Econometrics (2005)Variation in Institutional Strength (2009)The KOF Globalisation Index – revisited (2019)Expectations and the neutrality of money (1972)Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs. (1973)A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information (1986)RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES (1987)The New Neoclassical Synthesis and the Role of Monetary Policy (1997)
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References

  • 1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans7,938 cited
  • 1985The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target3,687 cited
  • 1993Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence1,832 cited
  • 1992Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes1,707 cited
  • 1991Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries1,597 cited
  • 1988Macroeconomics and Politics736 cited
  • 2003Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators594 cited
  • 2001Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence546 cited
  • 1983Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy421 cited
  • 2008Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions — Past, present and future407 cited
  • 2002Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies—an international perspective391 cited
  • 2007Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from Global Trends313 cited
  • 1995Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence306 cited
  • 2008Is There Any Link between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean256 cited

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  • 1992CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE254 cited
  • 1995Central-Bank Independence Revisited250 cited
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