The Governance Role of Minority State Ownership in Non‐state‐owned Enterprises: Evidence from Corporate Fraud in China

Abstract

Abstract This study attempts to shed new light on how the state as a minority shareholder benefits stakeholders, by investigating its role in deterring corporate fraud in non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs). Through an analysis of publicly traded non‐SOEs in China, this study reveals that minority state ownership negatively impacts firm fraud, and the results hold after alternative tests. The identified channels of this association are that minority state ownership mitigates tunnelling, enhances internal control, and alleviates the financial constraints of non‐SOEs. Further analysis shows that this relationship is more pronounced in firms with weaker corporate governance, stronger fraud incentives, and lower levels of political connections. Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of the role of minority state ownership in emerging markets within the context of corporate fraud, highlighting the importance of critically evaluating the effects of government intervention in different contexts.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 24 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.