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Online and offline dual-channel sales are widely adopted by leading blind box manufacturers. As a typical representative of probabilistic selling products, blind boxes’ online channel is usually self-run, while the operators of the offline channel are diverse. Depending on who is the offline channel operator (manufacturer or retailer), we view the two different structures as two strategies for the manufacturer. In this article, we study the manufacturer's strategy selection considering the probability discrimination of blind boxes between online and offline channels. The specific product styles in the blind box are divided into two types, i.e., popular and ordinary, according to popularity. The offline channel generally offers a better service experience, while the online channel can increase the acquisition probability of popular products. We find that the selection of channel strategy has no impact on blind box pricing but affects the offline service quality. The manufacturer prefers to operate the offline channel itself and provide better offline service when the probability discrimination is significant or the online marginal cost is low; otherwise, the manufacturer will choose the retailer to operate the offline channel. In addition, the increase in the consumers’ valuation gap between popular and ordinary products also encourages the manufacturer to self-run the offline channel. Counterintuitively, although the rise in the online acquisition probability of popular products enhances the attractiveness of the online channel, it ultimately damages the consumer surplus. Finally, we propose a two-part tariff contract to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain.
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Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 11 citations exist upstream.
Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
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