On the Aim of Belief

J. David Velleman

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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Abstract One reason, first pointed out by Bernard Williams, is that belief ‘s aiming at the truth enables us to explain the difficulty of believing at will.1 The explanation is that believing a proposition at will would entail believing it without regard to whether it was true, and hence without the aim requisite to its being a belief. Another reason for taking an interest in the truth-directedness of belief is that it may explain the phenomenon that has generally come to be known as the normativity of content. It may even explain the phenomenon away.

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2015Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias 2016In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief 2006The Epistemic Features of Group Belief 2007SELF‐DECEPTION AS PRETENSE 2007Does thought imply ought?2010The Puzzle of Imaginative Desire 2017Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief 2011What do we Aim At When we Believe?

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