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On the Aim of Belief
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On the Aim of Belief (2000)On the Aim of BeliefDelusional evidence-responsiveness (2021)Delusional evidence-responsiv…Instrumental Rationality (2020)Instrumental RationalityEpistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief (2017)Epistemic Utility Theory and …Beliefs as signals: A new function for belief (2017)Beliefs as signals: A new fun…In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief (2016)In Defense of Practical Reaso…Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias (2015)Attitude, Inference, Associat…After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism (2015)After Moral Error Theory, Aft…The Meanings of “Imagine” Part II: Attitude and Action (2014)The Meanings of “Imagine” Par…What do we Aim At When we Believe? (2011)What do we Aim At When we Bel…The Puzzle of Imaginative Desire (2010)The Puzzle of Imaginative Des…Expressive Actions (2009)Expressive ActionsActive Belief (2009)Active BeliefSELF‐DECEPTION AS PRETENSE (2007)SELF‐DECEPTION AS PRETENSEDoes thought imply ought? (2007)Does thought imply ought?The Epistemic Features of Group Belief (2006)The Epistemic Features of Gro…Imagination and the motivational view of belief (2005)Imagination and the motivatio…Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1975)Judgment under Uncertainty (1982)The case for motivated reasoning. (1990)Comments on Gendler’s, “the epistemic costs of implicit bias” (2011)Epistemic injustice in assessment of delusions (2015)The Gap (2019)The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. (1958)The psychology of interpersonal relations. (1958)Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011)Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science (2017)The wrongs of racist beliefs (2018)The best game in town: The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences (2022)The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. (1987)Knowledge in a Social World (1999)Group Knowledge and Epistemic Defeat (2015)Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration (2015)Trustworthy Groups and Organizations (2017)ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SOCIAL REALITY (2018)A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)Simulating Minds (2006)The Concept of Mind (2006)Explaining Imagination (2020)Imagination and Creative Thinking (2022)Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry. (1979)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES (2005)DOES BELIEF AIM (ONLY) AT THE TRUTH? (2012)Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity? (2016)Theory of inquiry (2020)Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (1979)11. Reasons and Persons (1986)Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)Utilitarianism for the Error Theorist (2020)Dear Prudence (2021)Normative Requirements (1999)How Truth Governs Belief (2003)Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind (2007)Should I Believe the Truth? (2010)XV-The Russellian Retreat (2013)Why Ideal Epistemology? (2021)The Will to Believe, and other Essays in Popular Philosophy. (1897)The will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy. (1907)The Moral Problem (1994)Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics: The Dialectic of Pure Reason (2018)The Game of Belief (2020)Getting Things Right (2022)Job Market Signaling (1973)The Evolution of Cooperation (1981)Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. (1988)Motivated ignorance, rationality, and democratic politics (2020)L’irrationnel aujourd’hui (2021)Signalling, commitment, and strategic absurdities (2021)What is Justified Belief? (1979)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding (2017)The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory (2017)
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  • 2015Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias424 cited
  • 2016In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief145 cited
  • 2006The Epistemic Features of Group Belief131 cited
  • 2007SELF‐DECEPTION AS PRETENSE123 cited
  • 2007Does thought imply ought?123 cited
  • 2010The Puzzle of Imaginative Desire118 cited
  • 2017Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief95 cited
  • 2011What do we Aim At When we Believe?91 cited
  • 2017Beliefs as signals: A new function for belief72 cited
  • 2015After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism57 cited
  • 2009Expressive Actions57 cited
  • 2014The Meanings of “Imagine” Part II: Attitude and Action55 cited
  • 2009Active Belief49 cited
  • 2021Delusional evidence-responsiveness48 cited
  • 2020Instrumental Rationality48 cited
  • 2005Imagination and the motivational view of belief47 cited

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