John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and Human Freedom

Abstract

Abstract It is not surprising that John of Damascus should assume that there is such a thing as the will, and that it is in virtue of having such a will that we are responsible for what we are doing. By John’s time this was a standard assumption which could be taken for granted. Though not originally a Christian doctrine, but of Stoic origin, it had become a standard view in Christian authors from the end of the second century onwards. But we also do have to keep in mind that Aristotle, for instance, on whom John of Damascus, directly or indirectly, relies a good deal for his account of human behaviour, does not in his account appeal to a will. Aristotle, too, assumes that human beings will ( ) things and that they do things, because they will to do them. And Aristotle, too, of course, must assume that, if human beings do will things, it is possible for them to will things, they can will things, they are able to will things. But to assume that human beings have a will is to assume more than that human beings can, or are able to, will things in this weak, trivial sense, in the sense in which quite generally possibility follows from actuality. It is rather to assume that they have the ability to will things in the sense of a basic, distinct, positive ability, comparable to the ability to discriminate perceptual features or the ability to understand things.

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