The Problem of Self-Observation

Abstract

Abstract This chapter provides an overview of some of the main developments in the use of introspective methods in early experimental psychology (mainly 1860-1920). During this period, a key concern about introspective methods was the problem of self-observation, namely that introspecting experience distorts or destroys the target experience. It was raised prominently by Auguste Comte and dominated methodological discussion among so-called ‘introspectionist psychologists’. The chapter applies the proposed framework to set out the flow of this debate among some of the main figures in early psychology, presenting their responses to the problem of self-observation. Doing so makes clear that one of the most salient differences among the different responses is the appeal to different modes of introspective access and how these are best exploited in an empirical investigation of the mind. This shows the value both of the book’s proposed framework and of the insights of the early psychologists.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 0 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.