The party politics of policy endurance: parliamentary settlements in Norway, 1980-2021

Abstract

This chapter moves the scope of positive public administration by connecting it to legislative performance and the role of party politics. It studies parliamentary settlements, defined as single-issue oversized majorities formed to engineer reforms that can endure a change of government. If and when successful, this legislative praxis exemplifies collective action by political parties to produce a common good: the endurance of public interest reforms. The chapter studies Norway’s parliamentary settlement praxis as it evolved between 1980 and 2021, covering the content and frequency of parliamentary settlements, how they depoliticize the problems at hand, whether they do in fact produce reforms that stick, and if the parliamentary settlement praxis has buckled under the trend of norms of compromise losing ground to winner-take-all political expediency. The chapter also discusses the balance of democratic advantages (e.g., limiting “the tyranny of the majority”) and disadvantages (e.g., “backroom politics”) of parliamentary settlements.

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